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Abstract 
In this paper I discuss various notions and aspects of integration and macroeconomic 
convergence, namely economic and monetary integration; real and nominal 
convergence. The EU has offered a great deal of information about the relation 
between all these types of integration and macroeconomic convergence. The EU has 
assumed that monetary integration is a precondition of deep economic integration and 
it has also assumed that the criteria to be adopted to converge to its own brand of 
economic and monetary union (EMU) are basically the same needed within the 
monetary union itself. Judging from the evidence of the first ten years of EMU, the 
actual relationship between real growth and inflation has turned out to be far from 
clear; and the paper provides a comparison between statistical evidence and the 
diverging predictions offered by two standard macroeconomic models.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
Integration is something that economists, historians and other social scientists have 
always liked to study, but which has always been up to political leaders to 
implement. The EU (European Union) and EMU (Economic and Monetary Union) 
are obvious cases in point as they in part reflect economic theory, but were put 
forward by leaders which only subsequently submitted them either to Parliament or 
to the people. No wonder that what Europe is doing is observed as a case study of 
unprecedented complexity and looked at with a mixture of sentiments which 
include interest, scepticism, hope and disillusion. In this paper we focus on EMU, 
which lies at the core of the experiment and in particular on the connections 
between the economic paradigm regarding integration and macroeconomic 
convergence and the actual economic policy-making which occurs in the Euro area. 
First of all, we highlight differences between economic integration and monetary 
integration. We then move to macroeconomic convergence. First, we look at the 
criteria adopted in the assessment of whether a country is converging or not before 
and after adoption of the common currency . We then make a distinction between 
real convergence and nominal convergence and their mutual relationship. The 
subsequent  section is devoted to the assessment of the relationship between 
inflation and real growth on empirical and theoretical grounds.  
 
 
2.  Economic Integration vs Monetary Integration 
 
Although there are deeply connected aspects between economic integration, 
exchange rate regimes and monetary integration, it is worth keeping them separated 
when discussing actual unions such as customs unions (European Economic 
Community, European Free Trade Agreement), currency unions (East Africa 
Currency Area, Belgium-Luxembourg, European Monetary System) and monetary 
unions (EMU) which have different dosages of integration in real and monetary 
matters.  
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As far as economic integration is concerned, factor mobility is the most-cited 
single criterion for adopting a fixed exchange rate regime. The theory of optimal 
currency areas was a purely academic exercise started by Mundell (1961) and 
based on the idea that regions with strong mobility of production factors do not 
need exchange rate flexibility. It is a pity, however, that regions do not have 
distinct currencies and over time the pattern of mobility of factors can change 
considerably.  The concept of optimal currency is clearly useless in understanding 
EMU. Trade openness is a different criterion from factor mobility, although it has 
similar implications for the exchange rate regime (McKinnon, 1963). Small 
economies are very open,  thus exchange rate fluctuations have a large impact on 
internal prices. The lower insulation that flexible exchange rates deliver in small 
and open economies means that there is nothing to be gained by floating the local 
currency against the currencies of their major trading partners.  
 
A third concept is path-dependence. Various authors have claimed that the 
historical degree of openness and factor mobility may not be necessary conditions 
for a successful currency union. By fixing exchange rates and by coordinating their 
economic policies, the actual Members of the Union can increase real integration, 
make inflation converge, attune business cycles and make the relationship between 
domestic inflation and real demand pressure similar across Member states. Over 
time this creates the most favourable conditions for optimality. These forces were 
present and certainly had a role in favouring the birth of EMU. Indeed, when one 
considers EMU, one immediately realizes that different considerations from those 
focused on in the canonical currency unions were playing a role in the creation of 
EMU. EMU is a monetary union, i.e. something more than a currency union,   
whose birth can be explained, on one side, by the difficulties of making a currency 
union work in an environment of free capital mobility and deeper integration and, 
on the other, by the benefits offered by the control of a stronger common currency.  
 
A different explanation of EMU is that fiscal profligacy during the 1980s and 
1990s was increasing public debt in many European countries, thus implying 
monetary accommodation, high inflation and exchange rate instability. In some 
countries, the trend was not sustainable and the risk of default loomed in the 
background. Furthermore, Europe – unlike the US --  was not in a position to 
borrow abroad. The creation of a totally independent, and thus non-accountable, 
central bank was deemed to be able to eliminate the possibility of governments 
monetizing public debt.  
 
A further interpretation is possible if we consider exchange rate policies. After 
the demise of the Bretton Woods system, all countries were forced to come to 
terms with their exchange rate policy. Some did this quite soon, others later on; and 
two strands of behaviour can be detected among the variety of experiences. On the 
one hand, all countries faced increasing financial interdependence and countries in 
all continents started to face increasing risks of exchange rate shocks,  particularly 
where the financial sector and the domestic economy were not robust. To achieve 
monetary independence in an environment of increasing capital mobility, some 
countries let their currency float while others -- a notable case being European 
countries that were integrating --  realized that, in order to fully exploit the 
economies of scale made possible by economic integration, some form of fixity in 
exchange rates and macroeconomic convergence were necessary. Europe made two 
experiments.  The first, during the early 1970s, was a system of bilateral pegging 
bands among the European currencies and the US dollar. This so-called “Snake in 
the Tunnel” was not a successful experiment. The EMS-ERM European Monetary   3
System - Exchange rate Mechanism) and the ECU (European Currency Unit) was 
the second and less unsuccessful one. Unlike the first, it showed that by fixing 
European bilateral exchange rates, some convergence in money aggregates and 
inflation rates was possible. In itself, the EMS-ERM was not able to bring about 
really stable exchange rates, but it did allow Europe to understand that in order to 
achieve exchange rate stability some other form of stability was necessary, notably 
that in the money market and other financial markets. To make  EMS-ERM -- i.e. a 
currency union -- functional, Europe realized that it was necessary to turn the 
independent national central banks managing a system of target bands into a central 
bank managing a common currency.  This offered  a solution to the famous 
trilemma according to which it is impossible to retain full control of monetary 
policy, and keep the bilateral exchange rates stable when capital is increasingly 
mobile. Economic and financial integration seems to require something different or 
something more from stability in exchange rates as the EMS-ERM experiment 
made policy-makers understand: that integration in the money and financial 
markets must be guaranteed. Experience shows that intermediate exchange rate 
regimes, i.e. regimes aiming at fixing exchange rates are inherently unstable thus 
restricting the choice to only two options: perfect flexibility or perfect stability. 
The EU chose perfect internal stability, in order to enhance internal integration, and 
perfect external flexibility in order to retain freedom in monetary policy so as to 
fight inflation most effectively.  The rationale for this being that economic 
adjustment can be obtained more efficiently by variables such as factor mobility, 
trade and price flexibility rather than exchange rates and demand policies. 
Exchange rate flexibility, indeed, could be more of a problem than a solution and 
increased trade integration makes demand policies less and less effective.   
 
The exchange rate and integration option is also being pursued by the current 
experience o Asia and other Pacific countries Wyplosz (2001) and Eichengreen 
(2004). There is evidence that in order to keep their exports competitive 
internationally Asian and Pacific countries are trying to reduce volatility in 
exchange rates both in the region and towards major trading partners and notably 
the US dollar. This  is demonstrated by the practice of managing the  domestic 
currency's exchange rates against a basket of major trade partners’ currencies, as 
China started to do in 2005. Although there is no clear political will of pushing an 
economic integration economic policy seriously ahead by creating suitable 
institutions and freeing domestic monetary policy from the national government, 
those countries are integrating their economies by adopting trade agreements, 
removing trade barriers,  and managing exchange rates. Trade integration is already 
high and increasing and some countries have also established bilateral swap 
agreements in order to face possible crises in managed exchange rates. 
 
 
3.  Convergence to EMU  
 
Convergence in the Euro area  is predominantly that included in the criteria that 
were established with the Maastricht Treaty and thereafter used to show the 
progress towards the adoption of the common currency by the Members  of the 
EU-15 until 1998.  It still applies to the countries that are not full participants in 
EMU and in particular to the countries that became members in 2004 and 2007. As 
of now, 15 EU Member States have adopted the euro while the other 12 are at 
present not full participants. Cyprus Malta are the last countries that have been 
found to meet all the criteria (ECB, 2007 and 2008a) and thus adopted the euro on 
1 January 2008. As the UK and Denmark have opted out of EMU, there are 10   4
States (Sweden included) that have been or will be asked to converge and apply for 
examination in the future. Of these, Slovakia seems to be closest to entry.  
 
The convergence criteria adopted by the EU focus on price developments, fiscal 
developments, exchange rate developments and one long-term interest-rate 
development. It is striking that they all focus on nominal convergence as opposed 
to real convergence, i.e. per capita GDP. They also neglect real integration, i.e. the 
aspects that have always thought to be necessary to the existence of currency 
unions. There has been an intense debate over the entire project and the admission 
criteria and over whether both nominal and real convergence are needed. De 
Grauwe (1994), for instance, remarked that the Maastricht criteria were an obstacle 
to monetary union; while a more optimistic view posits that nominal convergence 
makes real convergence easier. The debate continues now over the sustainability of 
the monetary union. The widening differences in competitiveness and the ensuing 
trade imbalances -- that were initially deemed unimportant as the integration of 
financial markets would allow them to be financed -- have now gained centre stage. 
More in general, it can be said that divergence in terms of economic growth and 
per capita income could weaken political consensus for euro policy-makers (The 
Economist, 2008).  The criteria for evaluating the position of countries wanting to 
join the euro has remained  basically the same as that used before the launch of the 
single currency. 
•  As regards price developments, the target is defined in terms of the average 
rate of inflation instead of the price level. The inflation rate is measured in 
terms of the HICP (Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices) in the 
admission country and must not exceed by more than 1.5 per cent the 
average rate of inflation in the three best Member States
2.   
•  Fiscal developments are in terms of budget balance and public debt. The 
Stability and Growth Pact is basically a tool for keeping budget balances 
on track and making the fiscal position sustainable. There is a 3 per cent 
cap on the budget deficit, but the deficit must also have a countercyclical 
profile. Its trend must be decreasing in those countries where the debt ratio 
is not below 60 per cent.  This regards the convergence of single 
economies. There is, however, the issue of macroeconomic governance and 
policy of the Euro area  per se. It is obvious that the enlargement of the EU 
will make the limits of European economic governance increasingly 
evident. 
•  The exchange rate needs to be stable, i.e. observe the normal fluctuation 
margins of the ERM-II
3 with no devaluation or change in the central parity 
for at least two years.   
•  Interest-rate developments refer to yield spreads in long-term securities. 
The yield has to be within the 2 per cent margin of the three best-
performing Members. Large spreads would indicate that the market 
believes that securities of the same maturity in the different member 
countries are not of the same quality, as expectations on the official rate 
and short term yields are necessarily the same in a monetary union or in a 
currency union such as ERM-II. A narrow or a non-existent spread signals 
that the securities of two different governments are basically equivalent. A 
narrowing spread signals that the market believes that a country is going to 
                                                 
2 In the last Convergence Report (ECB, 2008), this implies that the average of the three best Members 
States (1.7 per cent) augmented by a 1.5 per cent posits a limit of 3.2 per cent on HICP inflation in the 
admission countries.  
3 ERM-II is the ERM since the introduction of the euro (1 January 1999).    5
be accepted into the euro zone. In this case also, the security market would 
forgive any difference in default risk if the different issues were not of the 
same quality as if admission per se brings with it  an implicit bail-out 
option. 
 
 
4.  Convergence within EMU 
 
Within EMU, nominal convergence basically boils down inflation, budget deficit 
and public debt. Indeed, exchange rates no longer exist and long-term interest rates 
have shown strong convergence across countries, although some widening started 
to emerge in 2008.  
•  Under the current mandate, the ECB seeks to promote price stability, 
which means that the HICP inflation rate is expected to be close to but 
below 2 per cent in the medium term.  The limit is deliberately 
unambiguous and was decided autonomously by the ECB. The Bank’s 
Council also has full operational independence in setting interest rates to 
ensure price stability. The limit of 2 per cent for the Euro area  has always 
been considered too low for two reasons. In the first place, it compares 
with the target interval of 2 per cent±1 per cent which many other central 
banks adopt
4. De facto, the ECB tolerates less inflation than other 
respectable central banks. This might be explained by bearing in mind the 
opportunity cost of inflation. Even if the ECB's mandate contemplates 
price stability only, growth matters. By choosing a lower inflation limit, 
the ECB shows it believes that the opportunity cost is a lower growth rate 
than otherwise
5. In the second place, critics have claimed that the euro 
zone is rather heterogeneous
6 thus requiring either more dispersion around 
the limit of 2 per cent, or a higher limit. Recognizing that inflation 
expectations are among the main causes of inflation, the ECB believes that 
by anchoring expectations it is able to deliver the best outcome. As to be 
effective in anchoring expectations, a bank must be credible, the ECB 
adopted a strategy combining independence from the political power and 
commitment to a formal, explicit and rigid target. Until recently, its 
strategy was different from that of the Federal Reserve (Fed) since instead 
promoting both price stability and maximum sustainable employment as 
does the Fed, the ECB pursues price stability only and  announces its 
inflation target because it wants to be accountable. It is, therefore, 
particularly interesting to see whether the ECB's strategy has been able to 
deliver price stability
7. The ECB shows itself to be acutely interested in 
understanding the inflation process by investigating not only past 
performance, but also by refining its forecasts on future inflation by using 
a number of monetary indicators, cost indicators, all sorts of models  and 
by direct measures of inflation forecasts (ECB, 2008)
8.  
•  Besides the 2 per cent inflation limit, the Euro area  has other "magic 
numbers" for assessing monetary policy and fiscal developments in the 
                                                 
4 Indeed, the UK, Canada, Sweden, Australia and Israel have 2 per cent±1 per cent. Although  
Switzerland adopts the same limit as the ECB, Norway has 2.5 per cent. The Fed (Federal Reserve)  
and the BoJ (Bank of Japan) do not have a fixed target.  
5 On this point see further below.  
6 On this point see further below. 
7 Even if the ECB has only one target, sustaining growth is no less important.  
8 Ibid. p. 36-37.   6
Member States. The 2 per cent HICP inflation target resembles the 
experience of West Germany before the euro. By assuming, quite 
optimistically, that the average long-run real growth rate in the Euro area  
is 3 per cent and that velocity of money circulation increases at 0.5 per 
cent, the average increase in the money stock is readily computed as 4,5 
per cent, which is the money target of the ECB. By assuming that the 
nominal growth rate in the Euro area  is 5 per cent, a public debt to GDP 
ratio constant at 60 per cent implies a budget deficit to GDP ratio of 3 per 
cent, i.e.  6 . 0 / 03 . 0 05 . 0 = . It can be seen that neither inflation, budget 
deficit, public debt not real growth were really in line with the forecasts 
and targets implied by the "magic numbers"  just mentioned. 
•  As for inflation, Table 1 shows the average inflation rate in the Euro area  
from 1997 -- i.e. the year that was the reference for the initial convergence 
assessment that marked the end of stage II of EMU
9 -- to 2006,  i.e. the 
eighth year of stage III. The first point to be noted is the  difficulty that the 
ECB faced in bringing the area-wide inflation rate below the 2 per cent 
limit even during a period in which inflation was subdued globally. The 
second point is the presence of stable inflation differentials. Table 1 shows 
that three of the economies with a higher than 2 per cent rate of inflation 
are slow-growers (Italy, Portugal and The Netherlands) while the rest are 
fast-growers (Spain, Greece, Luxembourg, Ireland and Slovenia). The 
difference clearly reflects those  experienced during the EMS-ERM as if 
the common monetary policy were not entirely effective. The ECB's 
mandate is about area-wide stability. It cannot limit changes in relative 
prices either across sectors or across countries, thus the persistence of the 
inflation differentials that are shown in Table 1 cannot be judged a failing
10 
in the common monetary policy.  It cannot do much about it, but -- 
nevertheless -- it cannot ignore it.  
 
•  Indeed, the ECB (ECB, 2005 and 2008b) is well aware that inflation 
differentials reflect both healthy adjustments in relative prices and the 
vices of the single economies, but its conclusion seems to be that existing 
disparities in the inflation rate are not destabilizing the real economy. As is 
well known, under a common monetary policy, inflation disparities feed 
back on the real economies in at least three different ways. Real interest 
rates are comparatively higher in the countries where inflation is lower, 
which is destabilizing if a lower inflation rate reflects a weak demand. Real 
wages are higher and income distribution is shifted in favour of workers. In 
the same countries and by the same token, external competitiveness is 
enhanced when inflation falls. The net results are uncertain and probably 
not the same everywhere and require further analysis. According to the 
ECB (2005), real interest rates based on expected inflation as measured by 
inflation forecasts offered by Consensus Economics are less dispersed than 
is the case of real interest rates based on actual inflation. This means that, 
to a certain extent, money illusion is present in the euro zone if the 
expected real interest rate is lower than the actual one or, in other words, 
that anchoring of inflation expectations is not perfect
11. Secondly, the ECB 
correctly points out that the effects of inflation differentials on real interest 
                                                 
9 Stage II ended in 1998.  
10 It is in any case a confirmation that the upper limit of 2 per cent is too ambitious.  
11 If anchoring of expectations were perfect, actual inflation would not deviate systematically and too 
much from what the central bank has announced.    7
rates are opposite to the effects on real exchange rates. Their effects on real 
demand  are thus partially compensated. The ECB, however, does not take 
into account the effects on real wages, which are negative when inflation is 
higher than the average.  
 
  Table 1 - HICP Inflation in  the EMU-15   
    1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006    
   Deviations from the Euro area  average  average 
De  -0,20 -0,60 -0,50 -0,70 -0,50 -0,90 -1,10 -0,30 -0,30 -0,40  1,39 
It  0,20  0,80  0,60  0,50  -0,10 0,30  0,70  0,20  0,00  0,00  2,26 
Be  -0,20 -0,30 0,00 0,60 0,00 -0,70 -0,60 -0,20 0,30 0,10  1,84 
Fr  -0,40 -0,50 -0,50 -0,30 -0,60 -0,40 0,10  0,20 -0,30 -0,30  1,64 
Ne  0,20  0,60  0,90  0,20  2,70  1,60  0,10  -0,70 -0,70 -0,50  2,38 
Sp  0,20  0,60  1,10  1,40  0,40  1,30  1,00  1,00  1,20  1,40  2,90 
P  0,20  1,00  1,10  0,70  2,00  1,40  1,20  0,40  -0,10 0,80  2,81 
Ir  -0,40 0,90  1,40  3,20  1,60  2,40  1,90  0,20  0,00  0,50  3,11 
                      
Au  -0,50 -0,40 -0,60 -0,10 -0,10 -0,60 -0,80 -0,10 -0,10 -0,50  1,56 
Fn  -0,50 0,10 0,20 0,80 0,30 -0,30 -0,80 -2,00 -1,40 -0,90  1,49 
Lu  -0,30 -0,20  -0,10  1,70  0,00  -0,20 0,40  1,10  1,60  0,80  2,42 
Gr  3,70  3,30  1,00  0,80  1,30  1,60  1,30  0,90  1,30  1,10  3,57 
Sl  6,60  6,70  5,00  6,80  6,20  5,20  3,60  1,60  0,30  0,30  6,17 
Cy  1,60 1,10 0,00 2,80 -0,40 0,50 1,90 -0,20 -0,20 0,00  2,65 
Ma  2,20 2,50 1,20 0,90 0,10 0,30 -0,20 0,60 0,30 0,40  2,77 
euro-13  1,7 1,2 1,1 2,1 2,4 2,3 2,1 2,1 2,2 2,2  1,94 
Source of Data: Eurostat 
•  Persistence in the inflation dynamics is usually defined as the tendency of 
inflation to converge slowly towards its long-run value following a shock 
that has led the inflation away from it (Angeloni and Ehrmann, 2004). It 
reflects basically two factors. The first is the measure by which inflation 
expectations reflect past inflation rather than future inflation. The second is 
the slope of the Phillips equation, i.e. the equation that relates the inflation 
rate to real demand pressure
12. The fact that in the Euro area  some 
countries are always above the average and the ECB target while others are 
steadily below both proves that persistence is high, i.e. that past inflation is 
still having an effect. There is, furthermore, ample empirical evidence of a 
flattening in the Phillips curves. This is unfortunate as a flatter Phillips 
curve implies a higher sacrifice ratio, i.e. the number of years that 
unemployment has to be higher than the natural rate to reduce the inflation 
rate by 1 per cent. 
 
•  There is consensus about the idea that the control of average and national 
inflation rates is not sufficient to ensure macroeconomic convergence 
inside EMU. Since the EU has a limited budget and EMU has no budget 
policy at all, the European case differs quite markedly from the case of 
federal states such as the US, Canada, and even Germany. The EU budget 
is not suitable for stabilizing real demand in its economy nor in that of the 
Euro area  as a whole. It is focused on cohesion, but it cannot be asked to 
                                                 
12 The ECB is trying to investigate the various aspects surrounding the Phillips curve (Kuester et al, 
2007; Musso, et al., 2007) inflation dynamics and price-setting in the Euro area  (Altissimo, et al., 
2006).   8
pursue  stabilization of aggregate demand. A national government's budget 
should act as an automatic stabilizer both at national level and at the area-
wide level, but the poor coordination between national governments offers 
no support. As the common monetary policy is targeted at inflation, the 
lack of a common fiscal policy limits the stabilization capability in the 
Euro area  as a whole. 
 
•  Convergence in the budget of each country is targeted at allowing 
automatic stabilizers to help smooth the path of the national economy 
without any reference to what the other countries do. This allows national 
governments to vary the fiscal balance in line with the cyclical position of 
the economy. The provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact put a 3 per 
cent cap on the budget balance. They also require that the budget balance 
net of the cyclical component should bring about the reduction of the 
public/GDP ratio to the target level, which is 60 per cent in the medium 
term. After the revision of the pact agreed in 2005, budgetary objectives 
are now calibrated with the debt ratio and the potential growth rate in each 
country, which means that in cyclically adjusted terms and net of 
temporary measures the target ranges between a 1 per cent deficit and a 
small surplus. After the creation of EMU, the adoption of a common 
monetary policy and the Growth and Stability Pact, long-term interest rates 
continued to show narrow spreads. While budget deficit remained broadly 
in line with the imperative of not exceeding the 3 per cent limit, public 
debt in high-debt countries did not show any strong tendency to decline 
below the 60 per cent target.  
 
 
5.  Nominal and real convergence 
 
The case of Slovenia (Member since 2007) is different from that of Cyprus and 
Malta h became members in 2008 (see Table 1), and  interesting. In 1997, Slovenia 
had a much higher inflation rate than the average of the Euro area  but it showed it 
was able to converge to the mean. This was very positive because it was an 
example of both low persistence and successful admission. It is also indicative of 
what was and is the typical pattern of other transition economies in the EU. The 
transition process obviously requires a structural change in the economy. During 
such complex a transformation labour productivity and trade openness increase 
rapidly and this yields a temporary acceleration in the rate of real growth. In 
transition economies, real convergence and other big changes take place  and this 
seems to imply a higher inflation rate. Real convergence, therefore, is said to 
require nominal divergence. The  channels through which real convergence and the 
implied real adjustment in the level of prices  feed on the inflation rate were 
investigated during the 1960s. There are two channels. The first and most well 
known is the Balassa-Samuelson effect which focuses on labour productivity in the 
different sectors of the economy. During transition, the gaps in productivities in the 
different sectors usually increase. As wages tend to be equalized across sectors, the 
combination of gaps in productivities and the equalization of wages makes 
inflation surge. This effect can be reinforced if the share of demand which is 
addressed to the non-tradable sectors increases over time along with the increase in 
per capita income and urbanization (this is the Linden effect). The latter focuses on 
the changing composition of  the consumption basket which is enhanced by the 
rapid increase in per capita income and by changes in the composition of labour 
force and by urbanization. The two effects refer to the first channel. The second   9
channel is focused on the degree of openness, which also increases during 
transition and integration. The increase in the degree of openness brings about 
changes in the structure of markets and in the degree of competition therein. If 
competition increases,  the level of prices is reduced. But this is only one 
possibility. Indeed, other changes are present (such as catching-up) which might 
really fuel price increases. The sign of the net result is uncertain, but recent studies 
(See: Sánchez, 2006; Lein-Rupprecht et al., 2007) was able to show that in the new 
EU member states it was mainly negative and thus opposite to the Balassa-
Samuelson effect.  
 
 
6.  Inflation and growth 
 
A well known empirical result (Barro, 1996) offers statistical evidence on the in the 
long-term relation between inflation and real growth. There are at least three 
different mechanisms at work behind what we see in the statistical relation going 
from real demand to inflation. As they offer different predictions about the effect 
that real growth exerts on inflation in the short run, the situation can be defined 
uncertain.  
 
We have already referred to the Balassa-Samuelson theory. This theory consists 
in the proposition that inflation is proportional to the gap in labour productivity of 
different sectors,  and it posits that if wages tend to be equalized across sectors, 
domestic inflation is proportionally higher. To some extent, this type of inflation 
differential is benign as it signals a technological catching-up in production.   
 
The second theory is the so-called New Keynesian theory. It blends demand and 
supply considerations  as it makes the inflation rate and the output gap mutually 
dependent. It also distinctly assumes that agents, the central bank included, are 
forward looking. The theory  basically consists of a Phillips curve in which the 
current inflation rate is dependent on past inflation and expected inflation
13, output 
gap and shocks. The output gap depends on the past and expected output gaps and 
the real interest rate. The latter is the control variable, and depends on the expected 
level of inflation and the output gap. Quite interestingly, the model has recently 
been used to make an assessment of inflation persistence in the Euro area  on the 
basis of  structural models
14 (Kuester et al., 2007; Altissimo et al., 2006; Galì - 
Rabanal, 2005; Angeloni - Ehrmann, 2004). The New Keynesian Phillips curve is 
still key in structural models, and particularly in the investigations that regard 
inflation persistence. Indeed, persistence increases if  the Phillips curve
15 flattens. 
Persistence also rises if agents do not have perfect information about the nature of 
shocks and the nature of the systems as, in this case, they put more weight on past 
inflation than on expected future inflation
16. A space for the central banks opens up 
                                                 
13 More precisely, past expectations of current inflation or, depending on the model, current 
expectations of future inflation.  
14 Other investigations are performed with reduced-form  models. 
15 Actually both traditional and New Keynesian Phillips curves are linear: Musso e al., 2007 and 
Altissimo et al., 2006. 
16 In the New Keynesian Phillips curve:  t t t t t t y E ε κ π γ γπ π + + − + = + − 1 1 ) 1 (  persistence is 
seen to be high when the curve is flat (κ  is low) . In this case, adverse shocks have limited effects on 
the inflation rate if the gap is large ( κ ε / t t y − = ). Persistence is also high when anchoring is 
weak, γ  is high and  t π converges slowly to  1 + t π .   10
accordingly, since by anchoring expectations, the central bank facilitates agents' 
learning. This should reduce persistence. The differences in persistence that still 
exist across the Euro area  may, indeed, be attributed to differences not only in the 
steepness of the curve, but also in the degree of rationality. In all cases, 
nonetheless, the relation between the inflation rate and the output gap is positive, 
although unstable according to the state of expectations about inflation. This also is 
the reason why the relation between the inflation rate and the output gap implied in 
any such New Keynesian model can be translated into a positively sloped relation 
between the inflation rate and the growth rate (Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1 - Inflation and growth in EMU-13, country averages (1997-2007)
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A further way of looking at inflation and growth is based on the aggregate money 
demand equation which was estimated for the Euro area  (Bruggeman et al., 2003 
and Brand  - Cassola, 2004). According to this theory, changes in the level of real 
output drive changes in the level of prices, given the amount of available liquidity 
and its velocity of circulation. In this case, the relation between the rate of real 
growth and the rate of inflation is inverse, which means that there is a possibility 
that a single monetary policy combined with permanent disparities in the rate of 
growth could be a source of inflation differentials per se, particularly if the euro 
money market fails to integrate perfectly. This theory offers a way of interpreting 
the observed differences in inflation across the Euro area  which is different from 
that purported by the New Keynesian theory, but which is compatible with the 
empirical evidence about the long-run relation between inflation and growth 
investigated by Barro (1996) 
 
Conventional money demand models assume that real GDP, interest rates and 
the price level are the determinants of the money that agents want in their portfolio 
and the recent estimates of the euro-wide money demand equation are no 
exception.  Bruggeman et al., 2003 and Brand – Cassola, 2004, and ECB, 2004, for 
instance, estimate that a stable long-run demand equation for the whole Euro area , 
such as:  t t t i y k m β α − + =  exists;  where:  t m  and t y are logarithms of the real 
stock of broad money and real GDP, respectively.  k is a constant, and  t i is the 
spread between the market interest rate and the rate of return of the money itself, 
i.e. the opportunity cost of holding liquidity. In the different estimates, it turns out   11
that the elasticity of GDP is always close to  3 . 1 , i.e.:  3 . 1 = α . The estimate of the 
other parameter is significant, but changes according to the market interest rate 
used to define the spread. As a matter of fact, it is   8 . 0 8 . 1 − ≤ ≤ − β , and in what 
follows we will assume that:  3 . 1 = β . The ECB apparently manages to offer the 
euro system the right quantity of liquidity in the whole Euro area  and manages to 
keep the short term interest rate at the right level. In doing this, it uses, among 
other things, excess liquidity measures derived from an equation of the type 
described above, on an aggregate basis. When there are permanent growth 
disparities inside and the money market is not perfectly integrated, the aggregate 
excess liquidity measure cannot signal differences stemming from those markets, 
but merely an average difference, and the common monetary policy may lead to 
inflation disparities across space. This can easily be seen by differentiating the 
demand equation with respect to time and using the resulting equation to translate 
the relevant real growth rate into an inflation rate. Let  i g and  i p indicate, as usual, 
the real growth and the inflation rates in country i. As the long-term rate of growth 
of the money stock is  045 . 0 = t m &  (Brand and Cassola, 2004), the equation in 
terms of percentage rates of changes corresponding to the one defined above is:  
i i g p 3 . 1 045 . 0 − = , as it is sensible to assume the spread as a constant, at least in 
the long run.  
 
Thus, if we use the demand equation together with a growth rate, we might infer 
the implied  inflation rate. As the ECB assumes that the euro zone has its own 
single demand equation and the single countries do not have one any longer, it is 
possible to assume that there is only one common inverse relation between the two 
variables in Figure 1.  Figure 1 shows, therefore, the long-run money demand locus 
which, according to the ECB, holds in the euro zone. It predicts that when the 
money stock grows steadily at 4.5 per cent a year, the average inflation rate in the 
euro zone is a mere 1.9 per cent, if the real growth rate is also constant at 2 per 
cent. As is obvious, an increase in money growth will yield higher inflation, all 
things being equal. If that relationship between growth and inflation holds not only 
for the euro zone as a whole, but also for the single countries, one could say that 
slow-growing countries will experience inflation rates higher than the average 
while fast-growing ones would experience inflation rates lower than the average, in 
the long run. But will this happen?  According to this theory, the answer will 
depend on the functioning of the money market. In the wholesale money market, 
the ECB system supplies liquidity to the banks and to the inter-bank market in the 
euro zone; while in the national retail markets, households and non-bank 
institutions apply to local banks. The pattern of inflation rates across the euro zone 
depends on how this dual market is able to channel liquidity and, thus, on its 
degree of integration. The target of a flat 2 per cent inflation rate both in slow 
growers and fast growers can be reached if liquidity can flow through the 
wholesale market from the retail markets in slow-growing countries, where it is 
abundant, to where it is scarce -- i.e. the retail markets in fast-growing countries -- 
thus forcing countries to revert to the long-run demand curve. A uniform inflation 
rate could ideally be reached even if real growth were not the same across countries 
only if the wholesale market were able to channel liquidity as above. The 
assumption of a common monetary equation does not necessarily imply that the 
dual market is able to balance supply and demand of liquidity everywhere at the 
current common interest rate. The ECB is interested in making the internal money 
market as efficient as possible not only for the sake of making the transmission 
mechanism as rapid as possible, but also keeping it correctly tuned. The ECB itself   12
aims at keeping the area-wide inflation just below 2 per cent;  but it would be 
optimal if all member countries remained constantly at this same mark. In this case, 
the ECB target could be represented by the horizontal line drawn at 2 per cent. 
While the money demand locus represents the behaviour of the economy in the 
long-run, the horizontal line indicates the target for the euro zone and for its 
members.  Money market inefficiencies and growth disparities, which are likely to 
increase in the enlarged euro zone, could bring about the observed disparities in 
inflation.  
 
At first glance, although the long-run money demand locus in Figure 1  seems a 
good fit for the pattern of average rates in countries such as Austria, Germany, 
Belgium, France and Italy, it leaves some outliers (Ireland, Greece, Luxembourg, 
Spain and Slovenia); and from this point of view it offers a data fit looser than that 
obtained with the New Keynesian supply curve (Figure 1).  
 
 
7.  Summary and Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have tried to summarise the criteria adopted to assess macro 
economic convergence in the Euro area . By considering convergence to the euro 
and within the euro, one immediately realizes that the credentials to be a member 
of EMU are different to those considered in the literature regarding currency 
unions.  The criteria adopted to assess convergence to the euro practically coincide 
with those regarding convergence within it. This is remarkable since convergence 
to EMU is merely a selection procedure; while convergence within EMU is 
considered something necessary for good policy-making if not for making the 
union sustainable in the long run. Those criteria are basically nominal and are 
focused on fiscal and monetary developments.  
 
Fiscal criteria are focused on budget deficits and debt-to-GDP ratios. 
Governments are asked to focus on the cyclical and non-cyclical components of the 
budget deficit. If they reduce the latter, then they can increase the former, thus 
increasing efficacy in their national fiscal policy.  Furthermore, when governments 
reduce their debt ratios, they benefit from lower interest rates, which lowers their 
debt burden. This is held to be a virtuous mechanism provided that the reduction to 
zero of the non-cyclical component of the budget deficit while being imposed on 
debt-ridden governments does not become a general rule.  
 
Monetary criteria regard inflation and exchange rates, but -- as is obvious -- for 
member countries they are limited to the inflation rate. The central bank is asked to 
pursue overall price stability, but cross-country differentials in terms of inflation 
rates and growth rates are quite important in a monetary area if they are persistent. 
Indeed, inflation differentials bear upon real interest rates; while growth 
differentials hinge upon per capita income differences and thus on political 
sustainability. The European Central Bank (ECB, 2008) is obviously more 
concerned with the overall performance in terms of price stability, but it is well 
aware of the risks implied by excessive and permanent differences across countries. 
In the last section we look at combined inflation and growth differentials lo see 
how they compare with predictions from theory. It is a commonplace that inflation 
dampens growth in the long run. This assertion is reinforced in a monetary union. 
In such a case, high inflation is also held to imply a competitiveness gap which 
cannot be eliminated through exchange rate adjustments (ECB, 2008) and which 
feeds back on real growth through the trade deficit.    13
 
We then reach the relation that goes in the opposite direction, i.e. to the final 
point of the paper. There are at least three available predictions and they have been 
briefly summarized in the last section. According to the pure monetary argument, 
slow growth countries tend to have higher inflation. Thus they risk becoming 
trapped in a positive feedback loop between growth and inflation (slow growth 
reinforces inflation and vice versa). The New Keynesian paradigm is more 
reassuring in that it sees a positive relationship between inflation and growth. High 
growth economies tend to have higher inflation and vice versa.  From the 
competitiveness argument just mentioned, according to which inflation dampens 
growth, it follows that between inflation and growth there is a negative feedback 
loop.  
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